



(Association of West European Parliamentarians 
for Action against Apartheid)
Harare, Zimbabwe
April 1990
Prepared by, and expressing 
views of consultant. 
Professor R. H. Green
1MOZAMBIQUE - Into The 1990s
It is not self reliance
To tell a man who has just lost a leg
To stand on his own two feet.
- Modern Southern African Proverb
A luta continua (the struggle continues)
- Lusophone African Mobilising Slogan
The Price of The Dream
Mozambique has not known peace for almost three decades. The war of 
liberation to break Portuguese colonialism in Africa - and the Fascist 
regime which clung to it in Portugal - ended in 1974. Almost immediately 
Rhodesian raids supplemented by the pseudo resistance movement it created - 
the bandidos armados who call themselves Renamo - began. South Africa 
while never friendly used primarily economic sanctions and buffets until 
1981. From 1981, however, it unleashed a "total strategy" of economic, 
sabotage and proxy war by terrorism (via the bandidos armados whom it had 
inherited from Rhodesia). This upsurge in mass murder and international 
terrorism (as documented fully and frequently not least in the US State 
Department's Gersony Report) was not halted or even lessened by the 1984 
Nkomati Agreement. At its 1986 peak it seemed on the verge of destroying 
the Mozambican state. Positive shifts since then owe at least as much to 
Mozambican, Zimbabwean and Tanzanian military success as to withdrawal of 
South African backing and direction from their proxy, the ba.
Over 1980-88 the cost of the war to defend the dream of a free Mozambique 
in a free Southern Africa was 900,000 dead who would have otherwise been 
alive. Direct war casualties were under a fifth, over half were infants 
and young children who died because the health and food security (by 
production or relief distribution) were destroyed.
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Source: UNICEF, Children on the Front Line, "  Children in Southern Africa." and estimates discussed 
in the text of South African Destabilization.
Economic loss in terms of lower gross domestic product over 1980-88 was 
$15,000 million - $3,000 million in 1988. Mass terrorism had forced over 
half of rural Mozambicans to flee for their lives at least once and, as of 
1988, at least a third of all Mozambicans were internal displaced/severely 
affected persons or refugees abroad. The transport and power systems were 
crippled; exports had fallen 80%; food production was down by up to 50%.
For comparison actual 1988 population (including refugees) was of the order 
of 16 million, GDP $2,750 million, exports of goods $100 million and the 
national food deficit before food aid 1 million tonnes. (For fuller 
details see Annex.)
CROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) LOSS 
IN THE SADCC REGION 
1980-88
($ million in 1988 prices)
1988 1980-1988
Country Loss
%  of 
Actual GDP Loss
%  of 1988 
Actual GDP
ANGOLA 4,500 90 30,000 600
MOZAMBIQUE 3,000 110 15,000 550
ZIMBABWE 1,350 25 8,000 145
MALAWI 550 30 2,150 133
ZAMBIA 500 20 5,000 200
TANZANIA 500 10 1,300 26
BOTSWANA 125 10 500 40
LESOTHO 50 7 300 42
SWAZILAND 30 5 200 33
ALL SADCC 10,605 43 62,450 210
Source: National data and preliminary 1988 G D P
3These facts are not only of historic interest - important as history is in 
shaping perceptions and imposing psychological, social and political 
constraints. They are central to understanding Mozambique today and 
tomorrow;
a. the end of war would not end the loss of output - rehabilitating
people, restoring livelihoods and reconstructing the capital stock 
will take at least a decade;
b. the war is - despite significant gains in most provinces and
districts (e.g. attacks on health facilities fell 75% between 1986
and 1988) - far from over;
c. nor has support from or via RSA ended - in the week after Nelson
Mandela's release in and out transborder raids by the ba claimed at 
least 100 lives including nearly 70 in the ambush of a civilian train 
carrying miners returning from the rand on the Resano Garcia-Maputo 
line. It may well be that senior RSA security personnel are 
ignoring/'sabotaging an end to P. W. Botha’s and Magnus Malan's 
strategy of total onslaught and refusing to obey President F. W. de
Klerk. The Mozambican dead are no less dead and the economic and
non-lethal human costs of international terrorism no less real 
whoever is masterminding the ba's transborder operations nor whatever 
their reasons may be.
Security: The Slow Ascent from the Abyss
Security - in the sense of ordinary people being able to get on with their 
lives - is improving in Mozambique. Compared to late 1986 the changes are 
massive in most rural areas. At their most dramatic in Angonia District of 
Tete Province where under 2,000 normal civilian population in contact with 
the District Administration could be found in late 1987 there have since 
mid-1988 been over 50,000 official and 'informal' returnados, largely from 
Malawi. Household food security has been restored; 1990 commercialisable 
sector familial maize and potato output may well exceed 20,000 tonnes.
Similarly, the RSA strategy of choking the landlocked core SADCC states by 
destroying all their routes to the sea via Mozambique has been defeated.
4The Beira Corridor held; fitfully and imperfectly but increasingly 
effectively. The Nacala and Chicualacuala (Limpopo) corridors are 
returning to life. In human services, health posts are being reopened in 
newly secure areas and loss of existing ones has at last been reduced below 
reconstruction/repair rates.
But the situation remains precarious and patchy. Transborder supported 
sabotage and terrorism in (rural) Maputo province reached new peak levels 
in 1989. These included systematic sabotage of the South Africa-Maputo 
power line and regular massacres of isolated homesteads or hamlets. Other 
foci of infestation by ba remained - notably on or near the Limpopo Valley 
Line, in the Ngorongoze Park and the Zambesia/Nampula border mountain areas 
as well as in the Zimbabwe/Manica Frontier mountains. Sporadic raid 
campaigns break out, not least in Niasa near the Tanzania border in 1989.
The Maputo and Niasa upsurges appear to represent a strategic shift to 
maximum visibility to the expatriate/donor community in Maputo and to 
Tanzania on the Niasa border. The aim would seem to be to discredit 
Mozambique by creating the illusion that security was worsening - or at 
least not improving - on a national basis.
Peace and Politics
Mozambicans and the Mozambican government want peace so long as its terms 
do not foreclose the dream of a free and increasingly less poor Mozambique. 
The unconditional amnesty for ba combatants and supporters who leave it 
illustrates this very clearly - strikingly so given the obscenely vicious 
strategy of terrorism, slave labour, mutilation and murder the ba have 
operated for a decade and a half. So do the regular attempts to negotiate 
with South Africa - given the total fraud of South Africa's 1984-1988 
'performance' of its side of the Nkomati Agreement.
But negotiating with the bandidos armados as a group poses very real 
problems, even though the Mozambique government is willing to enter talks 
without preconditions. The ba were a creation of Rhodesia (taken over by 
South Africa) to wage a proxy war of sabotage and terrorism. They had no 
domestic political or social base and have never had any socio-political or 
political economic programme. Whether one attempts to analyse by class, by
5cultural group, by religion or by geographic unit the results suggest 0.5% 
to 5% support for the ba group, in different areas . 'Nationally' they may 
have 20 to 25,000 armed bandits and 140,000 to 215,000 civilian supporters, 
i.e. 1% to 1.5% of the population. Even their military cadres appear to 
have been largely recruited by kidnapping.
With tiny, nonhomogeneous minorities backing an internal political dynamic 
and having no social, political or economic programme it is hard to 
identify a practicable negotiating agenda. To make ex-ba's a favoured 
class is neither economically feasible, politically possible nor (one would 
suppose) morally desirable. Given their history of activity as proxies for 
outsiders with no policies of their own, granting them the status of a 
political party would be a request for external destabilisation. Moreover, 
in some areas - e.g. Zambesia - increasing breakup of ba units has already 
led to freelance bandit gangs so whether ba 'leaders' could deliver their 
sometime 'followers' guns is, at best, problematic. In the end individual 
amnesty and military action - however agonizingly slow and costly - may be
the only practicable routes to peace. Needless to say both would be
facilitated if South Africa and other countries tolerating ba presence and
support cracked down on the allies and financial supporters of this
terrorist organisation in their own countries.
Mozambique - contrary to popular external perception - is devoted to the 
concept and practice of elections. From the mid-1980s onward these have 
been held regularly for local, district, provincial and national bodies.
In 1986 in particular the security problems which had to be overcome to run 
them were massive.
The elections are participatory and competitive. They do drop as well as 
endorse office bearers and neither status nor technical competence is any 
guarantee of selection. One may argue about the optimality or otherwise 
their form, but their reality - both in happening and in being a genuine 
selection process - is very hard to deny. National Assembly elections are 
long overdue. The dominant reason the government has sought a 1990 Census 
(which technically appears to be unattainable) is to have a base for 
holding them in 1991.
6But lack of security - or more realistically the continued reality of war - 
hampers the electoral process in more than technical and procedural ways. 
People's enthusiasm for governments which - even though trying - cannot 
provide physical security, access to basic services, food security or a 
context allowing escape from absolute poverty is likely to be low. Because 
performance can be better, this may not be true of main urban areas or of 
the rural ones least exposed to the war or with the greatest and most 
sustained post 1986 security gains. In some rural districts it is a stark 
reality. Strengthening of the democratic process in Mozambique does 
require peace because without it good enough performance to secure 
democratic support is, at best, next to impossible to achieve.
Economic Claw-back - Realities and Limits
Since 1986 the Mozambican economy has been growing. The present underlying 
trend is probably 4% a year. This may understate since data on sector 
familial agriculture are so bad as to have grossly understated 1981-86 
declines and probably now understate recovery (except in drought years).
The growth is fairly broadly based and includes commercially marketed 
agriculture and manufacturing as well as transport and construction. 
Assuming adequate rehabilitation and import content finance, it is 
sustainable and perhaps expandable to 5% to 6%. However, at such a rate 
1981 GDP per capita (even then under $300/capita) could not be regained 
until about 2005.
The problems are not primarily political or policy choice in nature. 
Mozambique has:
a. a war wrecked economy;
b. very few domestic savings (overall negative ones) as a result of
inadequate production, not excess consumption;
c. a gross exacerbation of the structural trade deficit inherited from
the Portuguese era;
7d. consequentially a Recurrent Revenue base covering little over half an
inadequate Recurrent and none of the Capital Budget;
e. no earned foreign exchange after external debt service, retention 
allowances to importers, electricity, certain fuel purchases and 
external state offices, i.e. total dependence on doadores for normal 
import cover;
f. a shortfall of at least 20% (1 million tonnes) - almost 50% for 
grains taken separately - between domestic food supply and levels 
minimally adequate to end moderate and severe malnutrition;
g. 60% or more of its people existing in absolute poverty;
h. inherited human investment levels so poor that despite major 
education efforts since independence, the largest ministerial cadre 
of graduates in a Maputo ministry is under 20 and professional 
positions still have to be filled by persons with incomplete general 
secondary education;
i. a record of non-success - for whatever reason - and low wages ($30 to
$180 a month in the public service - pre tax) has devastated the 
morale of a majority (by no means all) government and large 
enterprise employees.
Arguably having a functioning government that does - even if inadequately 
as it readily states - administer, provide services, review performance and 
devise policies to rebuild is a quite remarkable achievement under these 
circumstances.
The contention that the private sector has been frozen out was never as 
true as it was believed to be. The Portuguese private sector (colon and 
metropolitan) left despite attempts to encourage it to stay; Portugal 
nationalised the parents of many Mozambican enterprises; "intervention" of 
bankrupt private firms was not nationalisation (owners who will pay debts 
and rehabilitate can get them back, as some have done); the basic ration
8(abastacimento) and textbook distribution systems are wholly private at 
retail level and have been for several years.
In any case, the present stress on full use of the private and familial 
(peasant and 'informal' non-agricultural household producers) is very 
marked. It probably exaggerates the capacity of the former outside the 
Maputo and Beira municipalities and beyond medium scale, simple sectors 
like Maputo passenger transport (a spectacular success of opening up to 
private enterprise). Foreign investment is welcome (retaking "intervened" 
firms, oil and mineral exploration and development, joint ventures, export 
platform companies - to date one shirt factory - the Beira Corridor Group 
etc). But given the security, infrastructure and economic conditions 
external private investment is, and - outside special niche areas - is 
likely to remain, very low in the 1990s.
Absolute Poverty: The Parameters of Penury
Over 60 %of all Mozambicans live in absolute poverty. Of urban Mozambicans 
this grim existence afflicts at least 30% and was as high as 50% at the 
time of the 1988 Urban Survey; of peri-urban Mozambicans about two thirds; 
of Mozambican refugees and dislocated persons virtually 100%.
Absolute poverty means exactly that. It is comparable to the bottom 40% of
households in India and is characterised by over 60% of cash and self 
produced income going on food but not yielding an adequate nutritional 
level. Child malnutrition in urban Mozambique is over one third and in 
rural about two thirds according to the 1988 urban and 1989 rural sample 
surveys.
Outside urban areas the quantity and quality of clothing and of shelter is 
frequently appalling by any standards. War is a cause - destruction of 
housing and disruption of transport - trade - cloth production. But 
poverty locks the victims into this debased status quo - even with physical 
access to cloth (production of which is rising) or to construction 
materials, produce to sell and money to buy no longer exist. Where it has 
been possible to restore production and commerce - e.g. in cashew nut 
collecting areas and some vegetable and cotton growing localities there 
have been marked recoveries since 1986, but these remain the exceptions.
9Basic service (primary health care, primary education, pure water, 
agricultural service) access is uneven and in a majority of districts 
exiguous both absolutely and in contrast to 1981. In health a claw-back 
has begun since 1986; in education rural enrolment is still falling; in 
water a crazy guilt of micro donor initiatives may or may not have halted 
decline but defies both broader rationality and the recreation of any 
national rural water strategy. Again war is the cause, resulting poverty 
(of the state to finance programmes and of rural families to pay fees) the 
lock on escape to decent, assured service provision. Agricultural 
extension is a somewhat special case - the colonial regime provided none to 
small black farmers and the 1980 Mozambican decision to focus on extension 
services to them lacked both relevant data on what to extend and trained 
personnel even before the rising tide of war swept over it after 1981.
The urban situation is somewhat less appalling because war has not 
physically swept over the cities - civil society, civil government, and 
both production and commerce have continued to function surprisingly 
normally even if under very severe financial, physical availability and 
skilled personnel constraints. The urban minimum wage of $30 is designed 
to cover the basic food, clothing and shelter needs of a family of five and 
with secondary incomes (by other household members as well as the wage 
earner) in cash or kind (e.g. "green zone" food plots) of about $15 a month 
can keep a household of five or six above the absolute poverty line. It is 
regularly revised in an attempt to maintain this position (including late 
1988 corrections when the Urban Survey showed early 1988 price and wage 
changes had, in fact, radically increased absolute poverty).
But a core of 30% of urban households are in absolute poverty. The main 
groups are a) female headed households with no formal sector wage earning 
member; b) households headed by aged or disabled persons; and c) 
households with substantially above the average number of dependents and 
only one formal sector wage earner.
Basic services provision in cities is much better than in rural areas.
Basic health services (including immunisation and mother/child clinics) are 
available. The 1988 introduction of consultation (excluding mother/child 
and immunisation) fees and drug charges has, however, sharply reduced use
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(except for immunisation, mother/child clinics). Primary education is 
widely available, but with low teacher qualifications, virtually no texts, 
double or treble shifts and severe problems in teaching the medium of 
instruction, its quality leaves almost everything to be desired (e.g. 60% 
repeat/fail rate in first primary year and about 60% fail rate in 
specialised secondary programmes with the per cent higher for direct 
entrants from primary schools). Pure water provision in low income, outer 
urban areas is as low as 20% because little extension has been possible 
since 1981-2 for fiscal reasons and because money, shallow wells and some 
boreholes have become unsafe as a result of rising nitrate levels.
Economic Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction
Mozambique's leadership has been among the first in SSA to assert that
poverty reduction was necessarily central to economic reconstruction and 
that it must be an integral part of macro economic policy and project goals 
not ghettoised in a series of peripheral add on projects. To assert that 
and to cite the rebuilding of domestic demand as the first priority of a 
structural adjustment programme in 1986 was an act of vision and of 
courage. Since then serious attention has been focussed on articulating 
that approach and on convincing doadores of its feasibility and prudence. 
The 1989 World Bank "Long Term Perspective Study" (From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth) now advances virtually the same analysis; a tribute to 
Mozambique's foresight and ability to stick to its position - and to
persuade others to agree at least in part since no country in the world is
more dependent on external aid food and finance.
This strategic approach has two fronts:
a. more production by poor people to increase their incomes, food 
security and effective demand;
b. increased access to basic services (health, education, water, 
extension) both to increase ability to work productively now and as 
human investment in the future but also as a direct contribution to 
improving the human condition of Mozambicans.
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There is a secondary element - safety nets for those who either 
transitionally (e.g. internal displaced and severely war affected persons 
and returning refugees, female headed low income urban households) or 
permanently (urban severely disabled or aged) cannot produce enough to 
survive. The production focus has three components:
a. expanding formal wage employment through general economic recovery
and use of more labour intensive methods particularly in construction 
and infrastructural works;
b. providing an enabling climate (access to education, tools, raw
materials, markets) to the artisanal ("informal") production sector;
c. restoring the base for rural sector familial (peasant) livelihoods
including production inputs, extension, tools, rural infrastructure, 
basic services and the (largely private) rural commercial network 
(rade commercial).
Mozambique's strategy - hampered as it is by lack of peace, skilled 
personnel and finance - is progressing. GDP is rising; Mozambican 
consumer manufactures are available (and in households) in growing volume 
over a widening geographic range; Maputo streets have more people, 
vehicles, petty markets on them and the people look better dressed and more 
hopeful than in 1986 (even if still less so than in 1980); real 
expenditure (including aid in kind) on health and education is rising; 
commercialised production of both domestic food and industrial/export crops 
is recovering.
But this recovery remains fragile as well as partial. With exports of 
goods and services perhaps $150 million, necessary goods and services 
imports - say - $1,200 million and debt service actually paid about $70 
million, external 'balance' depends on $1,100 million food, project and 
programme aid (plus ESAF) a year being mobilised and actually disbursed.
The whole public capital budget and up to 50% of the recurrent must be 
financed out of that and physically it provides the 70% odd import content 
of private as well as public fixed capital formation except for limited 
vehicle, machinery and construction material items the private sector 
finances out of unrecorded remittances and border trade with South Africa
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(probably under $100 million at most half used to provide physical inputs 
into private capital formation). Similarly mass starvation can be averted 
only if 500,000 plus tonnes of grain (plus sugar, vegetable oil, 
beans/pulses) or cash to buy them are made available. Breaking the back of 
malnutrition would require at least 1,000,000 tonnes - a level never 
approached even at pledge levels, still less by deliveries.
Livelihood Reconstruction: From Emerqencia to Rehabilitacao
Mozambique has over 1.5 million internally displaced people in camps 
totally dependent on support for survival; over 2.5 million displaced and 
severely affected who cannot fully support themselves; perhaps 2.5 to 3.5 
million still in their home areas who have lost almost everything in the 
war and can at best eke out bare survival; about 1.25 million external 
refugees almost all dependent for survival on support. These people have 
been the subjects of Mozambique's Emergencia Programme and the UN organised 
external funding effort on its behalf and of refugee programme fund 
raising, especially in the case of Malawi.
The international response has absolutely and relative to other emergencies 
been both prompt and generous from 1985 to date. On average perhaps $300 
million has been disbursed each year and up to 550,000 of grain received as 
well as some logistical and transport support to make delivery possible; 
not insignificant quantities of household equipment, agricultural tools and 
seeds for households and a number of micro projects in support of health, 
water and education for deslocados and refugees.
But that support has in absolute terms never been adequate to do more than
ensure bare survival. Counting refugees, 1.2 million not 0.55 million 
(0.70 million perhaps including refugees) tonnes of food were needed if 
serious malnutrition was to be ended. Logistical, transport, basic service 
and tool-seed-household equipment pledges - and especially deliveries -
were far below pared to the bone estimates of need (except for seeds in one
or two years). Worse 1989 showed a fall in pledges and even more in 
deliveries. "Donor Fatigue" has set in - if it is not reversed or new 
channels built the result will be donation non-recipient fatalities.
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The 1990 Emergencia request is smaller and more narrowly focussed on food 
for deslocados and returnados plus a few affectados and on means to get it 
to them plus limited health, water, utensil inputs to camps. This is not 
evidence of less need still less of lower Mozambique Government concern. 
Rather it reflects a sad, battered 'realism' in respect to what donors will 
in fact be willing to pledge and to deliver.
But need is both increasing and being transformed:
a. the increase in security allows persons previously in ba slave labour 
zones to escape to deslocado facilities or into Malawi and Tanzania 
raising the total numbers of deslocados and refugees;
b. with the beginning of restoration of security and civil government, 
it has become clear that in some districts (especially in Zambesia, 
Nampula and Sofala) peasants who did not/were unable to flee have 
lost everything and - lacking the organised support deslocados do 
receive - are the poorest of Mozambique's rural poor;
c. since mid-1988 up to 150,000 refugees have become formal returnados 
and perhaps 200,000 including self help returnees. As it takes 8 to 
15 months to prepare land, plant, harvest a crop and few returnados 
have substantial food, seeds or tools the implications for support 
needs are obvious;
d. deslocados and many affectados temporarily settled far too densely 
and in unsuitable areas for security reasons want to go home and must 
do so if they are to restore their livelihoods. To do so they need 
transport home, household equipment (e.g. buckets, plates, axes), 
agricultural tools, seed and food until a harvest is won;
e. amnestados (3,000 plus to date) and their families like returnados 
and affectados need livelihood rebuilding support if they are not to 
return to the ba or set up as bandits on their own account. There is 
the added problem that many may need to be resettled away from the 
areas of their terrorist activities.
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In other words, over 1990-95 support for 6 to 7 million rural Mozambicans 
is needed of the order of $400 million plus a year. Initially much will be 
food plus vehicles (road and water) and road/minor port repairs to move it. 
But much more transport to home areas, household equipment kits, seeds and 
tools, have district basic infrastructure repairs are needed. By 1995 food 
production should have risen enough to reduce grant import needs to - with 
luck - 250,000 tonnes, but the livelihood rehabilitation cash needs will be 
peaking. This is especially true because much of the Mozambique sector 
familial practiced mixed farming. They have lost all their small and large 
stock. Livelihood rehabilitation needs to include provision of core 
poultry, goat, cattle and - in some districts - drought animals. Whether 
these can be bred/bought locally or need to be imported from Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland is secondary. The primary point is that for 
herders and mixed farmers livelihood rehabilitation without stock 
rehabilitation is not possible.
Mozambique's government does not care how the support for war affected 
persons' survival and subsequent livelihood rehabilitation is titled. It 
cares deeply that it is made available. The need for phasing Emergencia 
into Rehabilitacao within an overall Mozambique support strategy was 
stressed at the 1989 Consultative Group Meeting.
The danger is that Emergencia will be reduced and nothing take its place. 
Many aid agencies divide their programmes into Emergency/Disaster and 
Development/Economic Support. Rehabilitation of livelihoods (e.g. after 
droughts) regularly gets lost in a crack between the two. If that happens 
in Mozambique the cost will be measured in millions of dollars of rural 
incomes lost; hundreds of thousands of tonnes of grain not produced and 
tens of thousands of deaths adequate rehabilitacao funding could avert.
Poor Producer Enabling/Absolute Poverty Reduction
The articulation of policy and programme packages to enable poor 
Mozambicans to produce more and to put in placed the restored 
infrastructure (including commercial network) and basic services which are 
essential elements of any enabling environment is still in progress.
Moving it ahead and increasing decision taking and programme operation
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capacity for it (from the levels of a national census through strengthening 
District Administration) is a government priority.
Some elements are in a more advanced state of preparation than others. The 
largest is the Priority District Programme to give substance to the 
strategic priority of livelihood and basic service rehabilitation for the 
sector familial (peasants). This programme is to comprehend 40 (of 130) 
districts, initially for 3 years each (not all 40 sub-programmes are likely 
to be startable in Year 1). This selection is enforced by security, 
resource, personnel and infrastructure constraints. It needs to be 
stressed that this is the first broad front strategic initiative it has 
been possible to envisage in respect to the campagna (countryside) in a 
decade and that priority to 40 districts is not intended to imply nothing 
for 90 (nor would the Regional Popular Assemblies who will review programme 
priorities and performance permit such a static or exclusionist approach).
The PDP is not a 'parallel administration' approach. It will:
a. coordinate basic service - health, education, water rehabilitation in 
the 40 districts;
b. utilise provincial Works Ministries (using seasonal labour intensive
methods already tested in rural Mozambique e.g. by ILO and UNICEF) to 
repair key infrastructure (especially bridges, stream crossing 
"boxes", culverts, roads, buildings);
c. build up extension capacity in the Directorate of Rural Development
in the Ministry of Agriculture (who are the coordinating directorate 
and ministry) and seek to identify existing and build up new 
agricultural research relevant to the sector familial;
d. arrange for/ensure that adequate supplies of essential household
(including house building ex axes, nails) equipment, seeds, tools are 
available to sector familial households (probably initially as grants 
given the administrative horror of small loan administration and then 
via the rade commercial);
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e. liaise with the National and Provincial Ministries of Commerce (and 
Agricultural Fondos) on steps to enable the rural rade commercial to 
have access to goods to sell, working capital to buy produce, 
vehicles to transport goods/produce and godowns for storage;
f. strengthen District Administrations to carry out the basic work in 
each district;
g. build up contact at all levels with the sector familial to ensure 
that planning and programme operation do, in fact, correspond with 
their needs and capabilities;
h. work with the National Planning Commission, Interministerial SDA 
Commission and Ministry of Finance to relate the PDP to national 
strategies and programmes and to mobilise domestic and external 
finance.
A basic service example is the revival of the APE (front line community 
health worker) programme. This programme built up in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s is basically an extension, popularisation, public health 
education system based on village cadres with short course training. Its 
links to basic health service units (postos, centros, mother/child clinics) 
and training always needed refinement - which is now beginning - but the 
basic problems leading to its post 1981 decline relate to war 
disorganisation of rural life and reduction of rural incomes. The 
programme was substantially local community supported (most of APE salaries 
in cash or kind); an approach not now possible in most districts. The 
survival of APE's in the least war torn province and several other 
districts where external support was available demonstrates its continuing 
interest to the sector familial. The community contribution (in cash, 
labour or kind) is to be rebuilt over time as community ability to pay 
rises but will initially be under 5% of total costs and 15% of APE pay.
Urban water supply has not been able to keep up with urban expansion in the 
canico (literally cane as opposed to concreto, i.e. concrete structure) 
wards. This is partly general budgetary stringency and partly past bipolar 
donor concerns: rural water supplies and major urban
water/drainage/sewerage schemes which left a sub-urban/peri urban gap.
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Maputo's canico is probably 25-35% served directly by public facilities 
(largely stand-pipe), 30-40% by private water sellers (who may retail 
stand-pipe or piped public water or use other - often unsafe - sources) at 
costs far above concreto (centre city) water piped to houses, and 30-35% 
household collected largely from relatively distant and/or unsafe sources. 
Shallow wells are now far above acceptable nitrate levels and some deep 
wells may become so (population density means that even improved latrines 
pollute the groundwater) so that the only practicable water source for more 
fountains (stand-pipes) is secondary pipes from primary mains.
It is intended to set up several canico and peri-urban neighbourhood sets 
of fountains. Charges will be set in agreements with community user 
committees who will collect them (on whatever system - per household, per 
user, per use with or without progressivity and/or exemptions - they 
select) to cover a substantial share of operating and maintenance costs.
If successful, the approach will be generalised to other cities and large 
towns.
As noted, urban employment (formal and informal) expansion and protection 
of minimum wage purchasing power ("fair price" shops for staples, plus 
adjustments to the nominal salaire minimal) are the key instruments toward 
reducing urban absolute poverty. However, urban survey data suggest 15% to 
25% of households cannot be protected by these means.
These are largely those headed by females and by aged or crippled persons 
with no wage earner and those with one low wage earner but an above average 
number of dependents.
Because local level data are good and both civil and bureaucratic records 
exist, it is possible to set up an income supplement toward food security 
for these categories. The Mozambique government has decided to do so and 
is seeking the $15 to $20 million a year needed to finance it for about 
400,000 persons at Mt 2,500 ($3) per month. That level of expenditure (via 
entitlement cards payable at bank branches for households with no employee 
and by employers to employees) would cover the ten main cities. The 
initial programme in Maputo is in the final stages of design and will be 
followed by other cities as soon as it becomes fully operational.
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In Summation and Looking Ahead
Mozambique is making visible, significant and sustained progress on the 
security and macro economic fronts. It shows great concern for building 
enhanced production by (including employment of) poor people and extension 
of basic services (human investment) to all Mozambicans. In the latter 
regard the number of programmes designed and the priority accorded them is 
convincing evidence that these are real political economic priorities not 
lip service.
However, Mozambique's sustained progress along these lines - enhanced 
security, rebuilt economy, reduction of absolute poverty - is at risk:
a. civil service morale (with many exceptions at the higher levels in
Maputo and some Provincial Capitals but fewer elsewhere and at lower 
levels) is poor - unlike military morale which is rising;
b. in many rural districts civil society morale remains low - albeit in
a majority of cases well above 1986 or 1987 and in some strikingly 
so;
c. urban civil society morale - especially but not only in Maputo - is
rising and in some cases is surprisingly high but this - like the 
rural improvements - depends on post 1986 improvements and will prove 
a wasting asset if they cannot be sustained, built upon and speeded;
d. while the plans and programmes sketched would do much to raise morale
(including in the civil service which needs better training, somewhat 
higher material incentives but above all visible results from its 
efforts) they depend on foreign exchange and fiscal flows beyond the 
direct control of the Mozambican state or civil society as well as on 
continued security gains which remain somewhat problematic so long as 
the bandidos armados clearly retain substantial external sponsorship.
Donor Driven or Donor Fuelled?
It has already been noted that Mozambique earns only enough foreign 
exchange from visible and invisible exports to cover retention allowances
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to cover their import cost; external debt service paid; electricity 
imports; the foreign exchange costs of Air Mozambique, the diplomatic 
service and necessary official travel and a small proportion of fuel 
imports. Similarly, under present economic conditions and production 
levels domestic revenue can cover somewhat over half the Recurrent Budget 
and none of the capital. These realities cannot be changed rapidly.
Therefore, Mozambique is totally dependent on external support for 
achieving survival of hundreds of thousands of its people as well as for 
economic and social rehabilitation and renewed development. This is the 
cost of externally imposed war by sabotage and terrorism superimposed on a 
traumatic post-independence transition, problematic past polices and 
unfavourable exogenous (local climatic and global economic) events. 
Mozambique is therefore, not directly comparable to Southern African 
countries less affected by war like Tanzania, Zambia or (because sabotage 
and terrorist incursions have been limited so that the production base is 
not crippled despite overwhelming military expenditure and extra transport 
cost bills) Zimbabwe.
Mozambique's economy and expenditure patterns have been described as "donor 
driven". That, unfortunately and unnecessarily, has been true since the 
early 1980s and until 1988 increasingly so. Because a host of 
multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental donors all with their own 
(frequently inconsistent) priorities and ideas have interacted with a 
dangerously understaffed and undertrained civil service coping with 
multiple crises, the results have been both inefficient and damaging to 
Mozambican morale and self-respect.
What is needed is a donor fuelled strategy - made by Mozambique in 
consultation with donors and, necessarily, financed by them. The thrust of 
Mozambican strategy and policy sketching, articulation and capacity 
development - as illustrated in its presentations to the 1989 Paris 
Consultative Group Meeting - is toward achieving that transformation in 
relations with external donors. (Donors is usually the correct term: with 
limited high productivity - high foreign exchange saving or earning - 
speedy payoff project exceptions Mozambique cannot afford anything except 
grants and soft loans).
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At one level what is required is a change in attitude. Because an economy 
is war ravaged and structurally weak; a state short of experienced, trained 
senior personnel; a Treasury unable to cover the minimum costs of essential 
services (including self-defence and security without which normal civil 
society and economic life are impossible) does not mean the absence of 
participatory or national interest directed political processes; of civil 
society at community and broader levels; of a functioning (even if feebly) 
civil government providing genuine services; of political vision; of 
enterprise and household entrepreneurship; of strategies and projects 
deserving technical and financial support rather than rejection out of hand 
in favour of someone else's agenda. This indictment of present donor 
attitudes is harsh - the Mozambican Government is considerably more 
charitable in its assessments - but it is not so much a criticism of 
intentions as of outcomes. It is hard and slow to deal with a bureaucracy 
with limited technical expertise (especially when a high proportion of its 
time is necessarily devoted to explaining things to donors not to getting 
programmes articulated and into operation. There are very clear and urgent 
needs donors and Mozambique agree on as to identification and most aspects 
of initial action. The pressure to act now and consult in any depth with 
Mozambique later and to respond ad hoc outside any overall strategy is very 
great. But the costs of this form of crisis grappling are high especially 
as the focus turns from survival to rehabilitation, structural 
transformation and renewed development.
At another level several concrete aspects or instrument clusters essential 
to a donor fuelled approach can be identified:
1. rehabilitacio (rehabilitation of household livelihoods) must follow 
on from emergencia for at least five years at a level of about $400 
million a year or neither short term physical or entitlement food 
security nor restoration of over 1 million sector familial (peasant) 
households to self-reliance can be achieved;
2. major projects and programmes need to be evaluated in terms of direct 
and indirect employment and income distribution effects as well as on 
rate of return, fiscal and foreign exchange impact;
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3. creation of an enabling environment for the sector familial to 
produce more - as spearheaded by the Priority District Programme 
initiative - is crucial to poverty reduction, to both physical and 
entitlement food security and to macro economic restructuring and 
imbalance reduction. Its core elements will - once 40 district 
programmes are in operation - cost at least $100 million a year;
4. basic service restoration and expansion is not an amenity for the 
post-recovery period but a human and productivity investment vital to 
both short and long term productivity and production expansion - a 
fact recognised in the increasing (if still somewhat haphazard) 
foreign exchange and counterpart fund support donors are making 
available to its dominant recurrent as well as its secondary (even 
though also priority) fixed capital side;
5. more standard capital projects do continue to be important, e.g. 
railway, highway and port rehabilitation and telecommunications 
strengthening (sectors relatively well articulated and designed at 
policy and project levels), in power generation (not least linking 
Cahora Basa dam to the Southern Grid and Swaziland when security 
permits), etc;
6. No donor programme not addressing loosening Mozambique's personpower 
constraints can be adequate. Strengthening local capacity and local 
course availability - including part-time, in-service programmes like 
the (UK) Open University's MA in economics - must be the main 
instrument quantitatively even though short and long overseas courses 
remain necessary in special fields. But that cannot deal adequately 
with the current desperate shortage of middle level technical and 
professional staff. 1980's - let alone 1990's - technical assistance 
models for, e.g. Zimbabwe or Tanzania or Ghana or Senegal are 
inappropriate because the citizen staffing capacity (as a result of 
the colonial and war heritage, not lack of priority) is lower than 
Tanzania in 1966 or Senegal in 1961 or Ghana in 1956. Mozambique 
needs accountants, engineers, rural programme articulators, 
statisticians and similar middle (or lower high) level personnel for 
line operating positions for up to five years. Without perhaps 1,000 
such persons indented for by Mozambique to fill its particular needs,
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additional high level advisers will be as crippled by gaps in data, 
analysis, articulation, implementation and monitoring as are 
Mozambique's - often very able even if not so often very experienced 
- top political, civil service and enterprise strategic and policy 
formulators, decision-takers and managers;
7. Overall net Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) at disbursement
level needs to be at least of the order of $1,250--!,500 million 
(including technical assistance and rehabilitacio) a year for at 
least five years. (Pledges have been up to at least $1,200-1,300 
million in some recent years.) Of this at least one-third should be 
allocated to programmes directly focused on poverty reduction through 
enhanced production by poor people and extended basic services. That 
$450-500 million would cover the non-survival food aid component in 
rehabilitacao, the sector familial initiatives and much of the basic 
service rehabilitation and extension as well as selective support to 
urban informal and small enterprise sector recovery and expansion.
8. Mozambique's external debt of the order of $3,000 million is both
crippling and unpayable. Certainly rescheduling by the Paris and 
London Clubs has been generous by past global standards. But $70 
million a year (the maximum payable) does little more than cover IMF 
and World Bank debt service, leaving arrears on other rescheduling 
arrangements ever rising. Realistically a total write-off of all 
bilateral debt (including exporter government guaranteed credits) 
incurred to the date of the write-off (or - say - 31-XII-87) and a
bilateral donor buyout of rescheduled London Club debt at $0.10 on
the $ would make sense for Mozambique and the nominal creditors who 
cannot ever be paid (unless they choose to make new grants to pay off 
old loans). It would leave a clean slate on which to plan prudent 
grant-soft loan-limited commercial loan strategies, targets and 
ceilings for Mozambique and its external cooperating partners. The 
opportunity cost of repeated reschedulings (at the Paris Club and in 
bilateral follow-ups) is very high:
a. the drain on senior Mozambican macro economic personnel time (its 
scarcest resource) is very high; perhaps 10% to 15% of all 
Ministry of Finance university graduates' person months;
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b. the uncertainty as to getting reschedulings and the consequences 
if they are delayed impedes Mozambican (and one assumes aid 
agency) forward planning:
c. so long as it is pretended that the past debt will be repaid no 
rational new soft loan, limited commercial loan, trade revolving 
credit strategies or projections are possible.
If full write-off now is not practicable a cost reducing formula 
might entail:
1. further write-offs on government/government guaranteed debts;
2. rescheduling all 1990s Paris Club (and other external government 
or government guaranteed) debt service plus all current arrears 
for 10 years with interest at 2% on rescheduled balances also 
rescheduled and the practicable ultimate repayment schedule (if 
any) to be negotiated in 1998;
3. a bilateral donor buy-out of non-performing commercial bank loans 
(including arrears) analogous to that done for Bolivia (at - say 
- one-tenth face value).
These are not minor proposals. But in real cash flow terms they 
would not increase the pledged Emergencia + Consultative Group + 
Other Aid flows by more than 20%. Nor are any of the components in 
contradiction either to any current basic principles of Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA), of the World Bank's Long Term 
Perspective Study for SSA nor of UN ECA's "Transformation" (African 
Alternatives) approach.
a luta continual
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